Never Ready by Kenton White - Book Review

Readers may recall my review of Battlegroup, by Jim Storr, last year. Included with that book was a slip advertising some of Helion & Co's new releases, one of which was this title, Never Ready, by Kenton White. Seeing as it tied in quite well with the period and subject of Storr's thought-worthy tome, I added this to my list of books to buy. It arrived just before Christmas and having given it a thorough read and some thought, here is my review.

White is a lecturer at the University of Reading in Strategic Studies and International Relations. His bio states that his main areas of research include British Defence Policy over the last two hundred years, and this is where this book comes in, focusing as it does on Britain's armed forces and those organisation's links to the declared NATO strategy of Flexible Response. This publication is an extension of his PhD thesis, expanded to cover a greater time period and re-written to be less academic in style. So how does he do?

The book is divided into seven chapters, building up to a finale detailing the author's conclusions. He begins with a summarisation of geopolitics and the Cold War, followed by a threat assessment, starting in 1967 and carrying through to the 1980's. These give a good background to the theatre and the nature of the threat NATO believed it was facing. Chapter three follows the planning that was put in place through the period concerned, which leads neatly on to chapter four and the British armed force's structure and equipment used at the time. Chapter five is probably the meatiest section, detailing as it does the individual services, providing greater detail on their equipment, how the forces were deployed, war stock levels and the political machinations that each had to engage in to achieve their specific goals. Chapter six focuses on the mobilisation question - how quickly mobilisation could occur for both front line and reserve forces, their move to combat, and the effect combat might have on those forces. It also provides a worthy narration of an exercise undertaken in 1983 that neatly demonstrates the key points the author wishes to make. Chapter seven finishes the discussion with two case studies, the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas conflict and the First Gulf War in 1991. Finally, chapter eight permits the author to provide closing arguments and conclusions.

Throughout, there are photographs, maps, tables and illustrations, all to the usual high standard expected of a Helion & Co publication. The photographs are varied and could be of some use to wargamers and modellers for details and paint schemes. The artworks are similarly good. 

This was an interesting read, well grounded in the period with a great deal of research behind it. It also provides extremely pertinent lessons for politicians and senior officers today. The main thread of the argument concerns that ever-present balancing act between requirement, capability and financial will (the latter of which is always fought as a political battle). Whatever requirements NATO presented, these always came into conflict with national requirements for that nation's armed forces and the political will to spend money on them - and it was always the will to spend money that decided the course of action. The author points out the underlying truth that NATO strategy rested upon the cast-iron requirement to go nuclear at some point, thus undermining the political will to spend money on conventional forces, but the sheer lack of sustainability baked into the armed forces by years of constant defence spending cuts meant that, if war had broken out, the expectation of nuclear release by day 8 would have been found wildly optimistic. 

For someone interested in that period of military history this is a very sobering read and one that, in effect, rubbishes the popular fiction of the period (Team Yankee, The Third World War, Red Storm Rising), and harks more to the cynicism and bleakness of Chieftains. No matter what public pronouncements were made by the British government, this book argues well that the eruption of conflict in Central Europe in the 1980's would have been a bloody and relatively short-lived affair. The two case studies reveal the truth to some of the points raised, but not all. The author notes that conclusions reached after these conflicts should be heavily balanced with the unique situation each involved. The over-reliance of reserves and the practical stripping of every working Warrior and Challenger in 1990/use of all aviation assets/majority of war stocks for a Corps, just to equip a reinforced division - these pinpoint the lie that successive governments have used to justify cuts to the forces. Just because both of these conflicts were victorious didn't mean to say that there weren't many, many issues that demonstrated how thin continuous cuts had made the forces. 

Indeed, there is a common thread of early equipment retirement, capability gaps, personnel shortages, over-reliance on reserves and under-funding of training that runs through the period covered by this book. Another key point is sustainability - the lack of war stocks, the dismantling of production lines able to replace losses, and the inability to continue fighting as, even if there was gear, could the logistics system get it to where it needed to be? 

I did have a couple of niggles with some of the discussion on weapons systems, where there could have been a tad greater clarity, but these were minor points. In all other respects, Never Ready is a very well researched and thought out book. It was eye-opening to me and compliments well my existing library on the period. For that, it is very much recommended and provides an interesting and suitable companion piece to Battlegroup! 

You can buy Never Ready directly from Helion here.