The Acorn PCW? Well, not quite...

Hold up! Before anyone gets too excited, no, we're not talking about Acorn making an actual equivalent to the computing legend that was, and is, the Amstrad PCW. No, what we're here today to talk about is the form factor due to an intriguing little nugget from the Business column of Acorn User's January 1995 issue. Something to make you think, what if...?

Not the original PCW 8256, but something more akin to the aesthetic of the era... ish.

By that point in Acorn's life, it was becoming clear that the range of machines launched in 1992 - the home-focused A3010, the school-centred A3020, and the slightly up market (and designed for business/higher education) A4000 - were in need of replacement. Times they had a changed, and whilst the '92 range were not exactly underpowered, their capabilities were starting to look a little stale. For example, sure, they could handle 640x480 at 256 colours in Mode 28, but higher resolutions such as the more prevalent 800x600 of the DOS/Windows world were limited to 16 colours rather than the PC's 256. This mattered to serious users, and the Business column had some thoughts...

Could Acorn have done it? Absolutely.

Did they do it? Obviously not!

Would it have worked if they had? Well...

To be fair, it wasn't a silly suggestion back then, but for those unfamiliar with either the original Amstrad PCW or the 1990's Compaq Presario all in one's, here's a brief refresher. 

Although there were many computers that could have been described as fairly inexpensive as and of themselves in 1985, adding printing to the mix was not cheap at all. Amstrad tackled this issue with the PCW (Personal Computer Word-processor), shoving a Z80 running CP/M into an all in one design rocking a 90-column display and a bundled printer, all for £399 ex VAT. Despite feeling a tad cheap, it and its successors sold by the bucket load because many people wanted the ability to print their works. Previously that had meant either dealing with the limitations imposed by the cheaper home micros, or the added expense of an MS-DOS PC, as well as pricing in a printer. The PCW bridged the gap nicely and thus sold like proverbial hot cakes.

The later Presario 460, but the form factor was the same for the 425.

Cut to the early 1990's, and Compaq were experimenting with the all in one concept with the original Presario 425, a 486SX machine running at 25MHz that would do what every other Windows 3.1 machine could do, just with the gubbins in one, fairly un-expandable, box. 

The "Family" PC.

That was 1993, and by late 1994, multimedia was king in the world of the PC compatible, and thus the Presario CDS 520 became a thing (as seen above in this December 1994 advert in Personal Computer World). Naturally, given the all-singing, all-dancing nature of the machine, it was pricey, so the ad leaned heavily into the "Family PC" concept because paying north of £1,500 to play Doom was worth it back then, 'onest, G'vnor! Having said that, despite rocking a ton of CD software and an integrated 9,600bps modem (think Virgin Media fibre on an average day...), the end result still felt compromised - only 4Mb of RAM, and that 486SX/2 might be running at 66MHz, but was seriously missing the D - that's the maths co-pro of the DX, you dorty minded porvorts!

So the question raised by the AU comment if Acorn had gone for an all in one form factor, what would the result have been? 

Undoubtedly the same specs as the A7000 that eventually did launch in the summer of 1995. A 32MHz ARM7500 that in effect made the A7000 equivalent to an unexpanded original Risc PC. The case was compact, offering space for either a CD-ROM or an expansion card, and yes kids, the CD-ROM would have been the better option for most, and all for roughly £1,100 inclusive of VAT for the 2Mb RAM, 425Mb hard drive model. That also included Acorn's AKF60 monitor, so actually fairly close to what the business column hinted at. Educational prices were somewhat lower - that bundle coming in at £799 ex VAT, but that was strictly educational only!

Acorn User's feature on the then new A7000.

Of course, if it were an all-in-one, the design would have been a smidge different. Expansion might have been a little better considering the extra space fitting the 14-inch display into the case would have entailed. The footprint of the CDS 520 was something like 36x38cm compared to the A7000's 36x28cm (rounded figures from what I have read), so a couple of podules and the CD-ROM could have been do-able. Some may have had concerns over that display size since users would have been stuck with it built-in. However, a quick check of a contemporary Watford Electronics ad in Personal Computer World shows a £40 difference between their own brand high end 14-incher and a 15-inch display. Not much, but still additional cost to Acorn if they'd have plumped for the extra inch - and yes, I am aware of the difference between consumer pricing and manufacturing costs. The difference would have been negligible but not zero. Also, let's also not kid ourselves here, 800x600 was going to be the sweet spot for the ARM7500 and fourteen inches was good enough. 

It would have been a reasonable offering for the new entry-level/mid-range RISC OS machine, fitting in quite nicely below the more expandable and powerful Risc PC700. However, there would be no room for a cheaper "headless" offering, and the cost of entry in to the world of RISC OS, already higher than it was when the A3010 was released, would have been kept relatively high due to nature of the all-in-one design. I also don't think Acorn had the resources or the desire to have two near-identical models to muddy the entry point market, either.

There was also the issue of price competition from the PC market. Using the CDS models alone, by the autumn of 1995, those pricey 1994 specifications were no longer as expensive. As you can see above and below, the CDS range was cheaper and re-spec'd by the time of these ads in the October 1995 issue of Personal Computer World. The SX model (sans modem) was now just £799 ex VAT, and a proper D-equipped computer (stop it, all of you!), although more expensive at £1,039 ex VAT, was still some £250 cheaper than the older CDS 520. The slightly re-jigged DX offering (the CDS 523 below rather than the CDS 524 above) could be had from another dealer for even less - £899 ex VAT. The point being that aside from changing the designs, there was no way Acorn could compete against the speed at which the PC market was advancing specs and lowering prices. That was the nature of the beast for every non-DOS/Windows platform, but raises the question as to how could Acorn reduce costs when one of the biggest considerations was the display. It made far more sense having just a box, and not only for ease of manufacture, logistics, and pricing flexibility. This also allowed the customer the freedom of using an existing display or Acorn being able to tack on a self-branded monitor for them to get a few extra quid for the balance sheet.

An all-in-one would have been funky, but nothing so great as to attract non-RISC OS users to the fold. It would also have done nothing to make the Acorn range price competitive for long against the juggernaut that was the PC. The fact that someone thought it might have been a go-er is still something to consider, and as we have seen here, park it in the "hmmm, interesting..." folder for reference.

P.S.

An all-in-one could have been an option in 1992, replacing both the A3020 and the A4000, but that thought doesn't really stand up to scrutiny. The A3020 was the new school machine, leveraging the same design as the A3010, with economies of scale for design and manufacturing. The A4000 was a business machine rocking a business-like case and EU-compliant separate keyboard. Their price points were similar, but not the same, as the A4000 offered a slightly bigger hard disk for serious users, and the A3020 could be had minus a hard drive anyway for those who just wanted a network machine. And what if you already had a perfectly good monitor but wanted something more than an A3010 but without the expense of the A5000? No, the 1992 range as it was made perfect sense for the time, and an all-in-one would have been pretty redundant. So effectively the same as 1995 then.

What if... RISC OS part three

This is the third of three articles published in the Wakefield RISC OS Computing Club newsletter last year. The articles focussed on three key years for the Acorn Archimedes and its successors - their original launch (with the Arthur OS) in 1987, the introduction of the A3000 (and RISC OS) in 1989, and finally, the belated attempt at the wider UK home computer market with the A3010 in 1992. 

I have taken the opportunity to expand each piece, and all views that appear here are my own, as are any omissions. Unlike the previous two articles, this entry contains a counterfactual, with real world information and sources listed at the end of the post. As nothing happens in a vacuum, the early period covered here will reference both Atari and Commodore quite heavily. 

I hope you like the slightly tongue in cheek approach to questions that were answered decades ago. No slights or offence intended. Please, enjoy.

Background - The early 1990's

The UK home computer market was, on the whole, settling in to 16-bit serenity. The 8-bit era was dead, despite Amstrad's puzzling attempt to update its long running CPC range with the 464 Plus and 6128 Plus (alongside the GX4000 console) in 1990. The C64 was finally winding down (polite society doesn't like us talking about whatever the idea was behind the C65 as a 1990's 8-bit computer), and not even repeated attempts to get the SAM Coupe to fly led to much other than putting a cherry on top of the type.

The 16-bit market might have looked healthier, but appearances were deceiving. Despite stating good sales of the ST range, Atari was in trouble. Financial results for 1991 revealed a hefty drop in revenue ($258m compared to $411.5m in 1990), and an operating loss of $18.7m, despite raising $40.9m from selling its Taiwan manufacturing plant (1). Corporately, they talked a good game, but there were serious concerns about its business. 

Commodore on the other hand appeared to be in positively rude health. Its 1991 financials revealed revenue of just over $1 billion, and a profit of $48.2m (2). Wait? What??? Yeah, it doesn't take an MBA (nor should it, Boeing!) to figure out that something wasn't right. A profit margin of less than 5% was not good, so whilst the numbers were, in some cases, very big and in the black, they did not paint a brilliant picture. 

Meanwhile, the DOS gaming world was slowly transitioning from the 286 to 386, yet it seemed that the minimum spend for a decent gaming PC was stubbornly sticking to close to a grand, and that, gentle reader, was folding money!

As for Acorn...

To be fair, they were doing ok-ish. 1991 saw a drop in turnover and profit, but still, squeezing out £274,000 from sales of £40.9m was at least a profit. That's better than Atari, and worse than Commodore (Acorn's margins appeared tiny) but they had also turned an overdraft of £6.5m in to a credit balance of £1.4m (3). It's also true they were a much smaller concern than either of the American giants, but things appeared to be going the right way. 

The RISC OS software development scene (and in particular games) seemed vibrant too. A steady stream of ports from the likes of Krisalis added to the home grown devs, some of whom were quite prolific. Capitalising on this, Acorn launched the A3010 for £499 VAT inclusive in the autumn of 1992, and this time they were gunning for the consumer market. Connects to TV? Check! Includes a joystick port? Check! Price parity with the competition? Hmmm... Two years later, things were not so rosy. With a half year loss of £2.2m and only a modest (£100k) increase in turnover, the problems seemed to stem from glut of A3010s (4).

But what if...? (cue wibbly wobbly screen effect...)

1992

Despite the growing popularity of games consoles such as the Sega Mega Drive and Nintendo SNES, Commodore are going just great, at least volume wise, with the UK arm expecting total Amiga sales of 300,000 machines that year. A600 sales are a bit meh, and certainly not at the numbers of its predecessor. The A500 averaged 25k units per month, the new kid on the block only 16k per month between May and August of '92 (5). With the announcement of the A1200 in the UK on October 21st, the Amiga has a much needed tech upgrade, especially pertinent since the core A600 spec is dated and not far removed from 1987's A500. That model takes a price cut from £399 to £299, and legacy high end models see prices slashed: the base A3000 can now be had from just £1,299 instead to its previous price of £2,999! (6) It all looks great, except for one thing... 

The A1200 is delayed, with only limited shipments reaching the UK by December. A combination of quality control issues and a failure to contract manufacturing in Scotland due to a liquidity squeeze within the main company means that instead of the expected 70k units, Commodore UK has just 500 to sell before Christmas. The presence of the new model, alongside some remaining stock of the much more expandable A500 Plus (a model whose production ended months prior), means that the A600 withers, with fewer than 50,000 machines making it off the shelves in the three months running up to the festive period. The A1200 situation improves slightly in the new year, but missing the all important Christmas period is a huge blow not only to Commodore UK, but also to the parent company. 

Atari are unable to capitalise of their traditional foe's woes. Their next generation machine, the Falcon, also misses the Christmas window. That it also happens to be nearly twice the price of the A1200 matters not. For that amount of money, you are also looking at a reasonable 386 DOS/Windows PC. Not even a pre-emptive price cut of the steadily aging STE to £199 can save them. For less than that, you can buy a SNES or Mega Drive if gaming is your thing. There are even plans to re-introduce the practically archaic STFM into production for an RRP of £159, with wildly ambitious/what the hell were they drinking sales figures of 150,000 mentioned. Never mind that they'd stopped making the STFM back in early '92 (7).

Acorn, however, do step in to the breech. The A3010 is a 1992 Christmas success. A solid effort by Dixons and other retailers desperate for some sort of cheap-ish home computer gives the machine a high street push, whilst advertising in ST Format (8), CU Amiga (9) and Computer and Video Games (10) targets those looking to either buy their first home computer (but not wanting re-heated mid-80's spec kit) or those wanting to upgrade said kit but can't buy it for neither love nor money. It's not huge numbers compared to the competition's usual figures, mind you, some 120,000 units by the time the dust settles(11), but it's enough to dent even Commodore's seeming omnipotence. Even the negativity of having an order backlog in the New Year doesn't hurt, with some mildly successful spinning of the shortages adding to the computer's allure. 

1993

The fallout from Christmas 1992 is apparent almost immediately. There is a rush of ports from traditional Amiga and ST developers to RISC OS as another source of games buyers arrives on the market. At a time when selling 10,000 copies of a game meant it was a big hit (and even 5,000 was acceptable) (12), getting even the latter figure on top of existing sales (and on a format that is relatively starved of games) is worth chasing. It's also a less capital intensive publishing environment than the console market. Following on from that, publishers begin to include RISC OS versions of new titles, some even taking advantage of the platform's capabilities, especially 256-colour graphics, aiding many a PC conversion. Much is also made of the fact that the Acorn's pack a 1.6Mb high density floppy which certainly helps with multi-disk releases.

Despite a rush of new sales and the aforementioned £159 STFM, Atari's bullish talk is beginning to sound like marketing bollocks. 100,000 Falcons (13) in 1993 is as believable as the 150k new build STFM's, and as the summer draws to a close, quality control  and supply issues mean that only 7,500 Falcons are in the hands of users (14). The financials for Q2 fail to mask just how far the company has fallen: net sales of $5.7m leading to a net loss of $6.6m compared to the same quarter in 1992 (15). Q2 was always expected to be a quiet business period, but even so, the silver lining of $35m in cash reserves doesn't hide the fact that it won't take long to burn through that. The company focus shifts to the Falcon and their new console, the Jaguar. Even that doesn't go well, with only around 1,000 consoles hitting the UK in December (16). The STFM revival is never mentioned again. 

Commodore, well, it's just a shit show and a half. The results for 1992 are dire. Revenue drops from that billion dollar mountain to $725m, and the corresponding operating loss of $86m stuns pretty much everyone outside of the C-Suite. The decision is made (once again) to double down on the Amiga, with every effort going towards the A1200/A4000 duo, as well as the CD32 console. That doesn't go well either. Having sat for too long on the A500/B2000 platform, the company are way behind the technology curve and having to push to make up for it. Already in a rushed development cycle, and with ongoing arguments about whether to hold off the launch until 1994 as per the planned roadmap (17) in order to have a decent software line up or scramble for whatever revenue they can get, the console is announced in May 1993, with a trickle of production units reaching stores that September.

It's a disaster. What units that make it to stores do sell, but there is a dearth of CD32 specific games. A1200 ports make up most of the announced titles, yet there are precious few of those as the A1200, already struggling, now faces competition from its console brother as well as the A3010 and the PC. Not that this matters, as by November 1993, Commodore's problems finally catch up with it. The parent company is declared bankrupt after finally running out of cash and the disposal sale is completed early the following year.

Acorn, however, are holding their own. A revitalised software stream and steady sales means that their financials announced mid-93 show a profit of £12.6m from a turnover of £72.1m, and a growing realisation that the platform isn't just for games. Windows PC's are a threat, but even now, a decent spec'd 386 is still the best part of a grand. The decision to standardise on a 2MB A3010 model in mid-93 pays off for Acorn, as does a price cut to £349. Margins are tighter, both for dealers and Acorn itself, but in the UK at least, sales of the 32-bit machine rockets passed the 350,000 mark by the end of the year.  

1994

As the new year hangovers clear in 1994, there is much for fans of RISC OS to rejoice, some good news for Amiga users, and little comfort for ST owners.

Atari are desperate and the fire-sale of STFM's and STE's adds pittance to the coffers. The Falcon hits £495 but there is little software available and the company's eyes its dwindling resources as it tries to make a success of the Jaguar. Despite lip service to the contrary, Atari as a computer manufacturer is all but done. The computer range is sold off and, in an effort to define the term "Forlorn Hope", the last roll of the dice is made for the Jaguar. 

There's better news for Commodore fans as the UK management team buyout succeeds in gaining control of what assets are left. A crash program is put in place, doubling down on the CD32 and the A1200, whose base price for Commodore manufactured stock hits £249, whilst the last of the A600's go for £149. The A300 is announced, coming in at £249 for an AGA-equipped CD-capable (an add-on drive appears from third party suppliers for CD32 compatibility). The CD32 continues to sell for £249, and a new licensing program is launched to bolster revenue. At the higher-end, the Amiga 4000 is retained. The future looks promising, as long as they can sell hardware, and there is bullish talk of a next-gen chipset. Paging Mr Osborne...

Acorn begin the year caught somewhere between shock and swaggering relief. The A3010 is selling as fast as they can make them, forcing some cannibalisation of the A3020 supply. That doesn't affect school sales too much, with the (Acorn) A4000 picking up the slack despite initially being advertised purely for secondary schools. A brief diversion in to making a home console is considered before sense returns to the room and a proposal is made to support the 3DO. This isn't as daft as it sounds, as the launch of the Risc PC in April means that there is now an expandable, CD-equipped tower running an ARM 610, for £1,500. Ouch for the pocket, but a hell of an upgrade for early A3010 adopters, aided by a trade-in scheme to push existing owners towards the higher spec. The presence of a guest CPU slot (and some fancy engineering) makes the 3DO card possible, and in November 1994, RISC OS users have the option of playing the (limited but slowly growing) range of 32-bit console titles.

However, the company isn't resting on its laurels, as it is apparent that the A3010 will struggle in 1995, not least because it will fall foul of new electronics legislation. They are also aware that the traditional market for home computers is slowly disappearing. The rise of the Windows PC, initially 386 and now 486-powered, has altered the dynamic of buying a computer. Budgets now stretch into the low four figures for a capable gaming PC, and the market is awash with consoles. There is also an acceptance that your bog-standard television is of no use as a serious computer display and that, just like the PC, future machines will require a dedicated monitor. As 1994 concludes, the consequences of this realisation reshape the home computer arena once more. 

Acorn strike with two ARM 7500-equipped desktops. One offers a desktop case with space for a CD-ROM, but includes a hard drive and monitor as standard. The other matches the styling of the A3010, but with included hard drive and TV/VGA connectivity. An external CD-ROM available for £150 proves a popular add-on. Existing owners have a clear upgrade path, whilst developers have hardware that can sustain ports from the PC world as well as console conversions. Indeed, throughout 1994 and 1995, RISC OS and the 3DO see a cross-pollination of titles. Rather than just Star Fighter 3000, there is enough software support to benefit both platforms. The lack of a dedicated 3DO card for the A7000 series does hurt the concept, but remains a handy upselling tactic for the Risc PC. Not enough, of course, to save 3DO from the Sega Saturn or Sony's PlayStation, but every little helps.

What could have been...

To boost sales, there is a trade in scheme that takes £150 off a new A7000-series machine, with the older computers handed in re-cycled for emerging markets. Acorn now have a trio of machines aimed at the low, mid and high level user, and news of a laptop based on an existing Olivetti design (18) demonstrates that the once majority shareholder still supports it's British off-shoot, and profits of £15.5m from a turnover of £85m are ample evidence of the company's success. 

1995

After another brisk Christmas period where Acorn announce their 1 millionth RISC OS machine sold, it becomes apparent that the pace of sales is beginning to slow. The breakneck speed of the PC's advance has meant that by the summer, even the billy basic 486 can be had for the same as the low-end A7000 CD-equipped model, and as Windows 95 arrives, it becomes clear that Acorn no longer have the upper hand when it comes to a price/power/capability comparison. There is little despondency though as the platform appears to have more than enough momentum at present.

The Risc PC700 arrives to pep up the hardware offerings, and discussions begin about the future of the platform. The new laptop proves a hit, and whilst there are signs that the company is beginning to lose the education market to the Wintel combination, the relatively buoyant home market in the UK brings in the money. It is acknowledged though that this is a shrinking percentage of an ever growing pie of general users. Even so, profits of £13.2m off £76m revenue are a reason to celebrate.

Less good news for Amiga fans as "Neo-Commodore" closes its doors in September. Despite valiant efforts with the CD32, it becomes clear that it isn't a competitor in the wider console wars, selling less than half the numbers of even Atari's ill-fated Jaguar. Against the new offerings from Sony and Sega, it isn't even a joke. There are rumours of a successor which would beat the newcomers, but time (and finance) isn't on the their side. The A300 similarly failed to sell against the vibrant Acorn machines, and despite a licensing scheme that saw the Amiga brand on everything from mugs to towels (the PJ set was the nadir), the company's biggest problem was that it just could sell enough computers. It didn't help that the AGA tech underpinning the range was only just competitive in 1992 and looking increasingly antiquated in 1995. Talk of more advanced machines dampened enthusiasm for the current range, and squeezed by more successful consoles at the low end, Acorn in the middle, and by PC's at the top, it was doubtful even with that £50m investment fund they could have succeeded. 

1996

It has been a good run, but the seasonal sales figures for 1995 come as a bit of a disappointment to the Acorn board. The company has still sold some 70,000 machines as a good proportion of adopters from 1992/3 decide to upgrade, but there were some heady sales projections being bandied about in the autumn prior. Acorn's share price takes a hit, and a company-wide re-organisation is put in place. The primary consequence is the complete decoupling of chip designer ARM. What's left of Acorn is then organised into two distinct divisions: Workstations, which continues the hardware business, and Open Acorn, aiming to further develop and expand the reach of RISC OS. The latter hints at early talks of the "Network Computer" leading to rumours of an Acorn designed box with a custom RISC OS ROM, whilst the NewsPAD, leading a European initiative for a portable multi-media viewer, becomes something of a minor success.

Development of the successor to the Risc PC is begun, and there is an urgency about the project as the venerable slice-based desktop began life with a 33MHz bus and the latest StrongARM processors run at 233MHz, hampering its performance. Project Phoebe promises a revised internal architecture and more developed StrongARM processors, as well as utilising current PC standards. The four PCI slots will come in useful...

With the internal reorganisation and increased research and development, although revenue dips to £65m, profits are down to £1.2m, albeit with much ink spilled proclaiming it's all about investing in the future.

1997

There is an air of optimism abound in the world of RISC OS as the launch date for Phoebe is set as September, just in time for the European Computer Trade Show at Olympia. And there is even better news. After a chance encounter at the show (19), it is soon announced that 3dfx will support RISC OS and, indeed, by the Christmas of 1997, the first Voodoo graphics card arrives. In the short term, this places the Acorn range on a par (in capability if not quite in price) with regards gaming compared to the Windows PC, the consequence being that there is a minor surge in PC ports to the system. 

Ironically from the issue of Acorn User that said it was cancelled. 

It's not all good news though as the successor to the A7000 series (imaginatively called the A8000) are announced, again with two models, and it's almost instantly apparent that the base machine is being ignored. There isn't much of a requirement for a hobbled £500 general computer that really shouldn't be plugged into a TV, and the better spec pushes the price close to £900 that also includes a monitor. There is a general shedding of users as they jump to Windows and, later, the revitalised Mac, but enough remain on RISC OS to make Phoebe, at least, a relative sales success.

1998

Financial results for 1997 reveal some good and bad news. The A8000 is a flop, whereas Phoebe pushes past 50,000 units. Revenue is down to £51m although profits are a relatively healthier £4.1m, reflective of the high end desktop sale and a steady push of RISC OS into embedded markets. The last of the tail end early 90's adopters upgrades to the latest hardware and it's becoming clear that the heady days of six figure sales numbers per annum are long gone. To those in the know, there is a general feeling of managed decline creeping in, and before the end of the year, the A8000 is cut to a single spec only, just to retain a sub-£1,000 machine.

1999 to 2002

And managed decline it is, as although there are processor upgrades for Phoebe, there is no replacement desktop planned. The failure of the Network Computer initiative isn't a stunning blow to Acorn, and the decision is made to sell off the set-top box unit to Pace Plc, also giving them a licence for the OS. It becomes apparent that the future of the company is more assured via software rather than hardware as the company posts its first annual loss in nearly a decade in 2000. In early 2001, what's left of the hardware team is disbanded, and the user base declines further into enthusiast niche territory. New machines do arrive from small scale manufacturers who can cater for sales in the hundreds, and it's only as the third year of the new millennium arrives that the last of the large games publishers abandons the platform, leaving the leisure market to solo and indie teams. 

As for the OS, in early 2002, the decision is made to open source RISC OS. There isn't the revenue to support even the cut down Acorn that remains, and it at least assures the future of the operating system as there is renewed interest in a free, low footprint OS.

(wibbly wobbly screen effect)

Plausible scenario or complete bull hooks? It was reported at the time of Acorn's sudden hardware volte face in 1998 that the core business had essentially lost money since 1993, so any success with the A3010 would have had an impact. I don't believe it would have been enough to see off the competition coming from PC or Apple (post 1998), but it might have changed the circumstances of the company's withdrawal from desktop hardware. It would also have affected moves like the co-founding of Xemplar and the cosying up to Oracle. Maybe... 

Final commentary:

When it comes to counterfactuals, your original decision point, the locus of change from actual history to the alternate version, has to be believable. So it is that I have chosen Christmas 1992 as that point. Without the success of 92's festive season, Commodore would have collapsed even sooner, and given that almost every computer manufacturer has suffered from quality control issues and shipping delays then, well, why not? The company was fleet of foot when it came to financial efforts, sometimes desperately so, but it's not too implausible that they might have struggled to pay for components and set up a manufacturing contract in mid-92. It truly was a make or break event. The success of the A1200 briefly rejuvenated the Amiga range and bolstered the coffers of the financially mis-managed company, giving it breathing room to continue the CD32's development and sustain the Amiga brand. And yet it mattered not a jot past 1993. 

According to David Pleasance (20), the decision to launch the CD32 in that year was made purely for revenue reasons and it hampered sales of the A1200. The issue here that even with the CD32, Commodore was failing, the console merely extending its death scene. That and without the 1993 release, there might not have been a Commodore left in April 1994 to launch anything. Nor would the CD32 have been the silver bullet even if it had made it to the US. The 1994 console market was rammed with new hardware: the 3DO and Jaguar were already out, Sega's Saturn and Sony's PlayStation were incoming, and I can't help but think that the CD32 would have looked extremely tired in comparison by the end of that year. 

With regards to the era after the collapse of Commodore, I'd like to think the UK management buyout could have worked, albeit for a limited period. The CD32 would have needed a replacement within a year or two, and the A1200 wasn't exactly cutting edge in 1992. It most definitely wasn't when Amiga Technologies were trying to flog them. Would the new UK/Germany-centric company have had the resources for the full-scale development of both a new console and an affordable home computer? It's not beyond the bounds of reason, and maybe David Pleasance will tell us in his latest book, but having experienced the "joys" of the Kickstarter journey for From Vultures to Vampires" (the tale of the publication of those three volumes is almost as convoluted as the story they tell!), I will not be finding out that way, at least not yet. And if you have seen the updates on Kickstarter, you'll know about the one dated 6th September, he's already running behind and "we might be late reaching the printing stage." Cynical me now awaits the announcement that due to the staggering amount of material, a second volume priced at £35 plus postage will be coming...

For Acorn, it's 1990's behaviour smacked of that must abused term (guilty, your honour) "managed decline", which is why it comes into use as the decade closes in the counterfactual. The ubiquity of x86 hardware and Microsoft's business practices meant that the DOS/Windows compatible was the general computing platform of the decade. Add in SVGA, soundcards, CD-ROMs etc, although you'd spend more money, you also gained greater capability. Even Acorn noticed this with the introduction of the A7000 range - these were priced similarly to low and mid-range PC's, following the pattern that the entry price point for a home computer had moved from a few hundred to nearly a grand, and you had to include a monitor as resolutions had advanced way beyond what your standard TV could handle. You could spend less, but that could often be false economy. The RISC OS high end was catered for by the Risc PC which for a short period could go toe to toe with the PC. However, the rapid development in the PC world meant that window of opportunity was exceedingly small. It would also have taken a degree of prescience few people have for their management team to make the "right" decisions every time.

As the decade closed, only Apple remained as an alternative to the Windows PC, rejuvenated as it was by the iMac (as well as a change of leadership. $150m from Microsoft and the timely sale of some ARM shares), demonstrating what a combination of in-house design and careful tech choices could achieve (excluding that pucking mouse - not a typo!). Acorn had proven in could do the same (my affection for the Risc PC design is well known, at least by regular readers), but Acorn was too small, and even the once hugely successful Apple flirted outrageously with financial destruction as the decade progressed.

Anyway, none of this really matters now except as the occasional day dream and pondering. I have more important things to do like maybe fire up my RISCOSbits PiRO Noir or Pinebook Pro and enjoy the best of what RISC OS still has to offer. Might I humbly suggest that you give the OS a try too...

Notes:
1) ST Format Issue 35 - June 1992
2) www.dfarq.homeip.net/commodore-financial-history-1978-1994/
3) Acorn User Issue 119 - June 1992
4) Acorn User Issue 150 - Christmas 1994
5) Commodore: The Final Years
6) Amiga Format Issue 38 - September 1992
7) ST Format Issue 46 - May 1993 - in this counterfactual, Atari pretty much continue as they did. 
8) ST Format Issue 40 - November 1992 
9) CU Amiga Issue 32 - October 1992
10) Computer and Video Games Issue 132 - November 1992

11) Archimedes World August 1992 news article claimed plan was for 70k sales predominantly to home market
12) Amiga Format Issue 53 - December 1993
13) ST Format Issue 46 - May 1993
14) ST Format Issue 50 - September 1993
15) ST Format Issue 52 - November 1993
16) ST Format Issue 58 - May 1994
17) Amiga Addict Issue 24
18) This would be similar to the Stork design from 1996 but two years earlier. 
19) Interview with Andrew Rawnsley of R-Comp Interactive 04/02/2023
20) Amiga Addict Issue 24

What if... RISC OS part two

This is the second of three articles published in the Wakefield RISC OS Computing Club newsletter last year. The articles focussed on three key years for the Acorn Archimedes and its successors - their original launch (with the Arthur OS) in 1987, the introduction of the A3000 (and RISC OS) in 1989, and finally, the belated attempt at the wider UK home computer market with the A3010 in 1992. 

I have taken the opportunity to expand each piece, and all views that appear here are my own, as are any omissions. I hope you like the slightly tongue in cheek approach to questions that were answered decades ago. No slights or offence intended. Please, enjoy.

Could 1989's A3000 have became the games machine of the period?

Nope. Article over, thanks for reading.

What? What do you mean I can't leave it like that? Oh, okay then! Just because it's you.

1989 was a pivotal year for home computing in the UK. The Atari ST was comfortably placed at the important price point of £299 (the same amount would get you the colour Amstrad CPC 464 combo, but that 8-bit offering was looking at tad tired by now), whilst Commodore's Amiga A500 was a ton more. Both connected to a standard TV via an RF input and were more powerful than any 8-bit machine, even the SAM Coupe (sorry, Colin!). More pointedly for Acorn, they were now cheaper than the 8-bit BBC Master that arrived in 1986 to secure the future for Acorn after a tumultuous couple of years in '84 and '85.

When Acorn launched the A3000 in the summer of '89 (that's what you should have sung about, Bryan!), despite possibly offering the best value on the market and having the benefit of RISC OS, it couldn't, realistically, break into the general home market for four reasons, and as such, this article is, like the first, more of a why not rather than a what if.

The 16-bit competition in November 1989

Price: At £649 excluding VAT, the A3000 was an ARM-powered bargain. A bargain until you realised you needed a monitor on top, and 15% of that total was added for Nigel's cut, meaning you were looking at just over a grand. That was and still is folding money (according to the BoE, about £2,500-ish today). Acorn couldn't really sell it any cheaper and it was only when The Learning Curve pack was released in 1990 that the A3000 could connect to a SCART-equipped TV. Those weren't exactly cheap back then either! 

Typical Acorn dealer prices at the tail end of 1989.

Software support: Here at least, Acorn tried to do something. Shortly after the A3000's launch, Acorn held a games conference with 30 "top development houses" such as Ocean, US Gold and Domark. Several firms promised trial titles to test the market and, indeed, some games did actually see a release. Yet within a year, most of those who had pushed a game or two onto the 32-bit wonder had given up to focus on the much larger 16-bit market. The comparatively low sales figures didn't lie.

The Competition: Atari had been selling the ST since 1985 and it had gained a good reputation in both the consumer and professional markets (the latter for it's musical abilities via the included MIDI ports, and budget DTP prowess). By 1989, it was the cheapest 16-bit computer and looked to be sitting pretty. A series of Packs bundling "hundreds of pound of games" (at original RRP's) had created a handily sized market for those who wanted (and could afford, for the newer machines weren't ubiquitous just yet) to move on from the 8-bit era. All was not well though. The Tramiel-led Atari wasn't cash rich, with the company's third quarter 1989 results showing a $5.4m loss from a turnover of $81.4m. Acorn, never the most profitable of companies to put it mildly, was at this point doing (slightly) better than that, generating a profit at least. Atari's big problems were that a) the base ST spec had remained pretty static since 1985, and the new STE would not be the panacea that was hoped for, b) an expansion into the DOS PC market stole precious resources the ST desperately needed, and c) the purchase of the Federated Group in 1987 hammered the US dealer network and extracted even more money from Atari's pockets.  

The ever-present Silica Shop advertising the ST in November 1989.

Commodore had, seemingly, learned the mistakes of the original Amiga A1000 with the A500. As with the ST, it could plug into your TV and it was demonstrably greater technical abilities than Atari's kit. In a marketing coup that year, they bundled the A500 with Ocean's rather decent Batman game, renowned flight sim F-18 Interceptor, platformer New Zealand Story, and industry leading art package Deluxe Paint II. Commodore hoped to sell 100,000 £399 Batman Packs. By the time it was discontinued the following year (remaining on sale long enough to take advantage of the film's VHS release), sales totalled some 186,000 units. They also released a Class of the '90's bundle, complete with a database package, DTP and spreadsheet software, Deluxe Paint II, and a MIDI interface and recording software. Oh, and a BBC emulator and some programs just to really stick it to Acorn. All for £499 inclusive. As a result, Amiga Format's February 1990 issue reported that Commodore had sold its 200,000th UK Amiga. To be fair though, just as the A500 was the cheaper, mass-market evolution of the Amiga A1000, so too was the Archimedes A3000 to the A305/A310, but there was a two year gap between Commodore and Acorn's generational leap. Given that Commodore would be the company to beat in the UK home computer market, that was a gap Acorn could never realistically close. 

November 1989 Amiga dealer ad.

Attitude: Acorn's approach was that educational sales justified the machine's existence (just like the Beeb), and consumer "serious home user" sales were a handy extra. That ended up being the right approach for the time - after all, Acorn outlived both of its 16-bit competitors, but this ignored the changing consumer landscape, something that every format outside of DOS (later Windows) did. And anyway, who was the "serious home user'? Anyone that could begin to fit that marketing buzz term was already well catered for in 1989. An A500 with monitor and hard drive could be had for less than a grand inclusive. Amstrad had the phenomenally successful PC1512/1640 DOS range, albeit with their replacement, the 2000-series, heralding the beginning of the decline of Amstrad as a PC manufacturer. A faulty hard drive issue meant that by the time the problems were sorted, not only had the reputational damage been done, but the market had also changed, meaning Amstrad was now just one of many box-shifters in the UK, and by no means the cheapest. PC's were not their only arrow though, and for those who wanted a cheap printer-equipped solution, the Amstrad PCW range was still reasonable value. Again though, times were a changing and their value for money against as printer equipped 16-bit micro was starting to become questionable. By the time you added a printer and monitor to an ST or Amiga, you were spending more than a PCW, but the ST/Amiga could do much, much more. Finally, if you had the readies, the sky was literally your limit for Macs. Even that would change in 1990 as the Classic made the Mac a sub-£1k option. 

The Amstrad competition (and remember to add 15% VAT on top!).

The Mac and, well, yes but no...

Not that the outside world mattered to the likes of BBC Acorn User. Their June '89 review of the A3000 was glowing, but the comment that "Once again, Acorn have produced the Rolls-Royce of home computing" demonstrated a lack of understanding as to how the home computer market worked and that the Rolls Royce concept was oxymoronic to a mass user base. Without said base, software developers wouldn't see the machine as viable. Without software, potential purchasers would look elsewhere. A follow up piece two months later admitted that Acorn's latest would inevitably be compared to the 16-bitters but it was actually more akin to PC's and Macs costs thousands, and anyway, taking inflation into account, the A3000 was about the same relative value as the original Beeb. To a cost conscious potential buyer, those comparisons didn't matter. Money talked, and all else was simple delusion.

In the short term, however, the A3000 proved to be a tonic for those wanting to jump to RISC OS and the machine proved a success, albeit not one for the home sector, but what if an A3000 package had been released with a few games and a TV modulator?

Hey, at least someone tried!

Well, there was such a bundle. ZCL, a distributor for Commodore and Amstrad products, put together the Jet Set Pack at the tail end of 1990. For a couple of quid under £750 VAT inclusive, you could have a TV modulator equipped A3000, the Euclid 3D package, and a trio of games: Interdictor, Trivial Pursuit and Superior Golf. All it lacked was a joystick but third party options were becoming available at that time. Stock was stated as "running into the thousands", and independent retailers were the first targets of the bundle. The only issue? Price. Again! For literally half that amount, you could pick up an Amiga A500 pack, with the spare change going towards a monitor, printer, hard drive or as many fashion conscious fire-hazard shell suits you could ever need (this was 1990, folks!). Acorn just couldn't compete on value in that particular market against the juggernaut that was the Amiga.

Dealer price for the Jet Set Pack - don't forget the VAT.

Not that the pack was advertised far or wide outside of dealers within the likes of Acorn User, and as 1991 got underway, the pack was discounted to under £700. At the same time, Acorn was happy to announce it had sold its 100,000th RISC OS machine, and that the A3000 was outselling the BBC Master 128 by two-to-one. A near five year old 8-bit machine and only 2-1??? In slightly better news, market data in April that year pointed to 55,000 RISC OS machines were shipped throughout Britain in 1990, 75% of which were the A3000 model. What were those Amiga numbers again?

But let's say they did. What if the original A3000 shipped with TV connectivity and a joystick port? What would have happened? Not much, really. The more impressive Amiga titles would have made it over, with maybe a few companies joining Krisalis Software as a worthy porting house. It might have helped ship a few more boxes into homes rather than schools, a few thousand perhaps as newcomers saw the educational benefit, or maybe with former ST owners who wanted something more powerful that the rapidly aging ST but wouldn't/couldn't stretch to the hefty entrance fee for a DOS machine, and didn't fancy dipping into the Amiga pool. There would, however, have been a slightly bigger RISC OS market for the next generation of machines, including a model aimed squarely at the Amiga and ST. By that time though, it wasn't a question of what if they could succeed, but what was the actual point?

What if... RISC OS part one

This is the first of three articles published in the Wakefield RISC OS Computing Club newsletter last year. The articles focussed on three key years for the Acorn Archimedes and its successors - their original launch (with the Arthur OS) in 1987, the introduction of the A3000 (and RISC OS) in 1989, and finally, the belated attempt at the wider UK home computer market with the A3010 in 1992. 

I have taken the opportunity to expand each piece, and all views that appear here are my own, as are any omissions. I hope you like the slightly tongue in cheek approach to questions that were answered decades ago. No slights or offence intended. Please, enjoy.

What ifs abound in the world of RISC OS. What if the Archimedes had launched with ARX rather than the rapidly put together Arthur operating system? What if Acorn had chased the mainstream home computer market rather than the self-proclaimed "serious home user" after the launch of the A3000? What if they had latched on to the interest generated by Zarch?

Zarch review from The Games Magazine.

Truly the title that defined the Archimedes when it first hit the streets, Zarch built upon Lander, the game bundled with the OS and was, for 1987, a stunning and groundbreaking experience in a world flooded by 8-bit micros. Mouse breaking too if you lacked patience... System sellers have long been a key driver in new computer and console sales, and there is no doubt that Zarch could have fulfilled that role for Acorn. To be fair, the Archimedes' basic price was an antidote for such hyperbole, but as example of what the ARM 2 could do, that was it, and it became a poster child for the Arc. 

September 87 show advert with Lander front and centre. 

Naturally, this garnered some attention, with the long established publication Computer and Video Games rating it a C+VG Hit in their January 1988 issue (albeit with screenshots for another game entirely), whilst ACE magazine gave it a whopping 979 out of 1000 (I know, a weird scoring system, but it remained their highest rated game for a couple of years) in its December 1987 issue. The Games Machine (another multi-format magazine similar to C+VG who would occasionally focus on the Archie, such as in their September 1988 issue), rated it at 81% but queried the price of the machine, and Acorn User was suitably impressed too. For the next six months, that was pretty much it until Conqueror took the base code of Zarch and made a tank game out of it. Again, this was covered in Acorn User and ACE, the latter bestowing a 931/1000 score alongside a comment about the game's complexity and 1MB RAM requirement - hefty for any 1988 format. Neither C+VG nor ACE were niche periodicals. The former boasted a circulation of over 100,000, the latter reached nearly half that, so when you think of the readership these two magazines held, never mind TGM, surely there was an opportunity here? 

TGM contents page September 1988.

ACE was very much the Edge of its day, and loved to cover exciting new technology as well as the more down to earth games market, and issue three featured a three-way comparison between the Archie, the ST and the Amiga. Archie came last, but only due to lack of software and, to be fair, it was just a few months out of the gate. It also featured Archie every month in the Pink Pages section, listed alongside every other common computer of the time, tech specs, prices and all. This, gentle reader, was a good thing, as there were no adverts for Acorn's range in the gaming press, and their initial ads in the likes of Personal Computer World were intellectually interesting but pretty drab.

For a 256-colour machine, the ads were a little... John Major-like.

The Pink Pages also began listing the best games on the market and, of course, both Archie titles were there too. Zarch appeared with the comment that it "could do for the Archimedes what the 'juggler' demo did for the Amiga." The context here is that when the Amiga was first demonstrated with an animated juggler, it was jaw dropping compared to the existing machines on the market. It was a vain hope for the Archimedes, as ACE always noted that both price (compared to the Amiga and ST), as well as software availability, would hinder Acorn's finest. Still, they would continue to cover the format well into 1990, with Clares' Interdictor grabbing 650/1000 early that year. 

In 1987, the ST was superb value. And relatively cheap. 

Could Acorn have shone the spotlight on the games that exemplified the sheer power of the computers it was supposed to be selling? Not really. With margins being so tight and the company neither regularly nor comfortably profitable, getting into the ST vs Amiga fight was not a sensible or realistic possibility. Even so, when Acorn User carried two page ads from Atari in 1988 (cheekily advertising the fact their ST Summer Pack contained £414 worth - at RRP - of games in a package selling for £399), you kind of get the impression advertising was not Acorn's strong point, although they did get one back in 1992 by advertising the A3010 in ST Format, but that was akin to whistling in the wind by that point... or was it? (You'll find out in part three).

The competition to the Arc in 1987.

That also ignores the state of the home computer market at the time. 8-bit machines ruled, with the Spectrum, CPC (both from Amstrad by this point), and the C64 surviving the cull of formats that wiped out many competitors between 1984 and 1987. Acorn's own BBC Master still sold in limited numbers outside of the educational market, and the Electron was still receiving a modicum of software support even then. The ST was the only reasonably priced 16-bitter at the time of Archie's launch. The DOS PC was epitomised at the time by the Amstrad PC1512/1640 (the latter was launched only a month of so prior to the Arc), and they started at £400-ish ex VAT for a mono single drive machine. Colour (CGA) took the price way above that of the 16-bitters, and add-ons such as hard drives or EGA placed the asking price of even Amstrad machines into Archimedes territory and beyond. Choose something other then Alan's kit and there was literally no limit. As for the Mac, that started at stratospheric and only went up; and Commodore were only just getting used to the idea that the Amiga 1000 was priced just a smidge over the odds for what people wanted. Even after the release of the A500 in the same year as the Archimedes, it would take a couple of years of plugging away to see sales tick up. The point here is that whilst Acorn had an immensely powerful desktop, you could get either cheaper machines with better software support and reasonably good graphical and audio capabilities, or equally priced/more expensive machines that delivered a greater overall capability. A hard drive wasn't yet an essential piece of kit in the DOS world, but the writing was on the platter...

The Mac in 1987. How much???

Maybe, if they had have noted the attention Zarch had garnered in those very early days, a few well placed ads might have picked up a handful of new users. Sales of both Zarch and Conqueror were considered disappointing (ACE issue 13, October 1988), not because of the reach of the games themselves in the Archimedes market, more that said market was still rather small. Cost of ownership was hugely important and, in any case, there was a looming two-way battle in the UK between Atari and Commodore, one that would demonstrate the need for huge developer support and corporate financial muscle (or canny juggling abilities) to compete in it - two characteristics Acorn was sorely lacking in. As it was, neither Commodore not Atari would survive the conflict anyway - Atari would concede after leaving the ST platform to wither for far too long, and Commodore would have a financial heart attack after years of "poor" corporate management. Even without such bullet/foot shenanigans, a combination of home consoles and the evolution of the DOS PC into a gaming powerhouse would likely have doomed both anyway. But I digress...

THIS IS A FUN COMPUTER!!! (sarcasm).

If Acorn had placed even a smidge more focus on the gaming potential of the hardware, it might have helped. A handful of ports (possibly paid for by the ever cash-strapped Acorn, perhaps, but extremely unlikely), and maybe a couple of bundled games, might have moved the needle, even slightly, anything to gain a little more traction in a market that, to be fair, wasn't ready to move on from the 8-bit era just yet. You didn't need mega-numbers of sales to be considered a successful title either - as late as 1993, Amiga Format reported that sales of 10k for a floppy game were enough for it to be considered a big hit. Even 5,000 was acceptable. Consider those figures in a 1987/88 context and you could have a valid financial reason to support the platform. 

Clares advert from October 87 with the first commercial game release, Minotaur.

So let's say that Acorn did push the A305 as a game machine, even though it was soon apparent that the A310 was the machine of choice due its greater memory spec. They sell another 5k machines to those gamers with deep pockets and/or understanding bank managers (no mean feat considering a) the early supply numbers, only 2000 A3xx series machines were expected in the first three months following launch, and b) the general UK economic climate as the 1980's drew to a close). What happens next?

ACE 3-way showdown page one December 1987.

First, it increases the reach of the machine. The estimated user base by the close of 1988 was something around 10k (according to ACE issue 13), where as of issue 7, they had the ST around 80-90k and the Amiga at 22-25k. Price cuts since that earlier edition had helped both American machines, so they were selling well for their price point. Even at 15k, though, that still created a market for games... providing those additional 5,000 sales were to home users. Sorry, Acorn fans, but school sales, whilst keeping the actual company afloat, didn't really count when it came to games. 

ACE 3-way showdown page 2 December 1987.

Even so, by the time the cost-reduced A3000 arrives, there are encouraging signs that low cost ports will sell on Acorn's machine, which could only benefit the newer machine, but it still wouldn't be enough. As far as the wider market was concerned, the Archie would never be the lead machine to develop on, so getting software that took real advantage of the extra power (especially the ability to display 256 colours) would have been difficult. It was also too early for the PC to help out, as until VGA took hold at prices approaching the sub-£1000 mark a couple of years later, there was little on offer to cross over. Yet as one of the UK supermarkets says, every little helps, and those extra users would have created a tail of sales support and awareness that certainly wouldn't have hurt the format. There would still, however, have been the issue of a relatively small installed user base compared to contemporaries and the educational stigma that would be hard to shift.

Less of a what if and more of a why not, the A3xx/4xx series were the trailblazers for Acorn. But could a cheaper machine, the A3000 have changed things around at a later date? With a more developed 16-bit market and the beginnings of the DOS PC's rise to ultimate glory, was there a chance for Acorn then?

That, gentle reader, is a what if for another time.