Sunday 18 August 2024

What if... RISC OS part two

This is the second of three articles published in the Wakefield RISC OS Computing Club newsletter last year. The articles focussed on three key years for the Acorn Archimedes and its successors - their original launch (with the Arthur OS) in 1987, the introduction of the A3000 (and RISC OS) in 1989, and finally, the belated attempt at the wider UK home computer market with the A3010 in 1992. 


I have taken the opportunity to expand each piece, and all views that appear here are my own, as are any omissions. I hope you like the slightly tongue in cheek approach to questions that were answered decades ago. No slights or offence intended. Please, enjoy.

Could 1989's A3000 have became the games machine of the period?

Nope. Article over, thanks for reading.

What? What do you mean I can't leave it like that? Oh, okay then! Just because it's you.

1989 was a pivotal year for home computing in the UK. The Atari ST was comfortably placed at the important price point of £299 (the same amount would get you the colour Amstrad CPC 464 combo, but that 8-bit offering was looking at tad tired by now), whilst Commodore's Amiga A500 was a ton more. Both connected to a standard TV via an RF input and were more powerful than any 8-bit machine, even the SAM Coupe (sorry, Colin!). More pointedly for Acorn, they were now cheaper than the 8-bit BBC Master that arrived in 1986 to secure the future for Acorn after a tumultuous couple of years in '84 and '85.

When Acorn launched the A3000 in the summer of '89 (that's what you should have sung about, Bryan!), despite possibly offering the best value on the market and having the benefit of RISC OS, it couldn't, realistically, break into the general home market for four reasons, and as such, this article is, like the first, more of a why not rather than a what if.

The 16-bit competition in November 1989

Price: At £649 excluding VAT, the A3000 was an ARM-powered bargain. A bargain until you realised you needed a monitor on top, and 15% of that total was added for Nigel's cut, meaning you were looking at just over a grand. That was and still is folding money (according to the BoE, about £2,500-ish today). Acorn couldn't really sell it any cheaper and it was only when The Learning Curve pack was released in 1990 that the A3000 could connect to a SCART-equipped TV. Those weren't exactly cheap back then either! 

Typical Acorn dealer prices at the tail end of 1989.

Software support: Here at least, Acorn tried to do something. Shortly after the A3000's launch, Acorn held a games conference with 30 "top development houses" such as Ocean, US Gold and Domark. Several firms promised trial titles to test the market and, indeed, some games did actually see a release. Yet within a year, most of those who had pushed a game or two onto the 32-bit wonder had given up to focus on the much larger 16-bit market. The comparatively low sales figures didn't lie.

The Competition: Atari had been selling the ST since 1985 and it had gained a good reputation in both the consumer and professional markets (the latter for it's musical abilities via the included MIDI ports, and budget DTP prowess). By 1989, it was the cheapest 16-bit computer and looked to be sitting pretty. A series of Packs bundling "hundreds of pound of games" (at original RRP's) had created a handily sized market for those who wanted (and could afford, for the newer machines weren't ubiquitous just yet) to move on from the 8-bit era. All was not well though. The Tramiel-led Atari wasn't cash rich, with the company's third quarter 1989 results showing a $5.4m loss from a turnover of $81.4m. Acorn, never the most profitable of companies to put it mildly, was at this point doing (slightly) better than that, generating a profit at least. Atari's big problems were that a) the base ST spec had remained pretty static since 1985, and the new STE would not be the panacea that was hoped for, b) an expansion into the DOS PC market stole precious resources the ST desperately needed, and c) the purchase of the Federated Group in 1987 hammered the US dealer network and extracted even more money from Atari's pockets.  


The ever-present Silica Shop advertising the ST in November 1989.

Commodore had, seemingly, learned the mistakes of the original Amiga A1000 with the A500. As with the ST, it could plug into your TV and it was demonstrably greater technical abilities than Atari's kit. In a marketing coup that year, they bundled the A500 with Ocean's rather decent Batman game, renowned flight sim F-18 Interceptor, platformer New Zealand Story, and industry leading art package Deluxe Paint II. Commodore hoped to sell 100,000 £399 Batman Packs. By the time it was discontinued the following year (remaining on sale long enough to take advantage of the film's VHS release), sales totalled some 186,000 units. They also released a Class of the '90's bundle, complete with a database package, DTP and spreadsheet software, Deluxe Paint II, and a MIDI interface and recording software. Oh, and a BBC emulator and some programs just to really stick it to Acorn. All for £499 inclusive. As a result, Amiga Format's February 1990 issue reported that Commodore had sold its 200,000th UK Amiga. To be fair though, just as the A500 was the cheaper, mass-market evolution of the Amiga A1000, so too was the Archimedes A3000 to the A305/A310, but there was a two year gap between Commodore and Acorn's generational leap. Given that Commodore would be the company to beat in the UK home computer market, that was a gap Acorn could never realistically close. 

November 1989 Amiga dealer ad.

Attitude: Acorn's approach was that educational sales justified the machine's existence (just like the Beeb), and consumer "serious home user" sales were a handy extra. That ended up being the right approach for the time - after all, Acorn outlived both of its 16-bit competitors, but this ignored the changing consumer landscape, something that every format outside of DOS (later Windows) did. And anyway, who was the "serious home user'? Anyone that could begin to fit that marketing buzz term was already well catered for in 1989. An A500 with monitor and hard drive could be had for less than a grand inclusive. Amstrad had the phenomenally successful PC1512/1640 DOS range, albeit with their replacement, the 2000-series, heralding the beginning of the decline of Amstrad as a PC manufacturer. A faulty hard drive issue meant that by the time the problems were sorted, not only had the reputational damage been done, but the market had also changed, meaning Amstrad was now just one of many box-shifters in the UK, and by no means the cheapest. PC's were not their only arrow though, and for those who wanted a cheap printer-equipped solution, the Amstrad PCW range was still reasonable value. Again though, times were a changing and their value for money against as printer equipped 16-bit micro was starting to become questionable. By the time you added a printer and monitor to an ST or Amiga, you were spending more than a PCW, but the ST/Amiga could do much, much more. Finally, if you had the readies, the sky was literally your limit for Macs. Even that would change in 1990 as the Classic made the Mac a sub-£1k option. 


The Amstrad competition (and remember to add 15% VAT on top!).

The Mac and, well, yes but no...

Not that the outside world mattered to the likes of BBC Acorn User. Their June '89 review of the A3000 was glowing, but the comment that "Once again, Acorn have produced the Rolls-Royce of home computing" demonstrated a lack of understanding as to how the home computer market worked and that the Rolls Royce concept was oxymoronic to a mass user base. Without said base, software developers wouldn't see the machine as viable. Without software, potential purchasers would look elsewhere. A follow up piece two months later admitted that Acorn's latest would inevitably be compared to the 16-bitters but it was actually more akin to PC's and Macs costs thousands, and anyway, taking inflation into account, the A3000 was about the same relative value as the original Beeb. To a cost conscious potential buyer, those comparisons didn't matter. Money talked, and all else was simple delusion.

In the short term, however, the A3000 proved to be a tonic for those wanting to jump to RISC OS and the machine proved a success, albeit not one for the home sector, but what if an A3000 package had been released with a few games and a TV modulator?


Hey, at least someone tried!

Well, there was such a bundle. ZCL, a distributor for Commodore and Amstrad products, put together the Jet Set Pack at the tail end of 1990. For a couple of quid under £750 VAT inclusive, you could have a TV modulator equipped A3000, the Euclid 3D package, and a trio of games: Interdictor, Trivial Pursuit and Superior Golf. All it lacked was a joystick but third party options were becoming available at that time. Stock was stated as "running into the thousands", and independent retailers were the first targets of the bundle. The only issue? Price. Again! For literally half that amount, you could pick up an Amiga A500 pack, with the spare change going towards a monitor, printer, hard drive or as many fashion conscious fire-hazard shell suits you could ever need (this was 1990, folks!). Acorn just couldn't compete on value in that particular market against the juggernaut that was the Amiga.


Dealer price for the Jet Set Pack - don't forget the VAT.

Not that the pack was advertised far or wide outside of dealers within the likes of Acorn User, and as 1991 got underway, the pack was discounted to under £700. At the same time, Acorn was happy to announce it had sold its 100,000th RISC OS machine, and that the A3000 was outselling the BBC Master 128 by two-to-one. A near five year old 8-bit machine and only 2-1??? In slightly better news, market data in April that year pointed to 55,000 RISC OS machines were shipped throughout Britain in 1990, 75% of which were the A3000 model. What were those Amiga numbers again?

But let's say they did. What if the original A3000 shipped with TV connectivity and a joystick port? What would have happened? Not much, really. The more impressive Amiga titles would have made it over, with maybe a few companies joining Krisalis Software as a worthy porting house. It might have helped ship a few more boxes into homes rather than schools, a few thousand perhaps as newcomers saw the educational benefit, or maybe with former ST owners who wanted something more powerful that the rapidly aging ST but wouldn't/couldn't stretch to the hefty entrance fee for a DOS machine, and didn't fancy dipping into the Amiga pool. There would, however, have been a slightly bigger RISC OS market for the next generation of machines, including a model aimed squarely at the Amiga and ST. By that time though, it wasn't a question of what if they could succeed, but what was the actual point?

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