This book had been on my wish list since publication, mostly because the late Cold War period is my thing. Having read this book over the course of a couple of days, I have to admit to being more than a little disappointed with it. It's not Lehman's writing per-se that is an issue, though his habit of jumping around with his chronology is a tad confusing. Nor is it the substance - generally there is enough detail in the vignettes to make this book worth reading. No, it's more that there are enough gaps and omissions to make you wonder what he has deliberately omitted and that makes this tome feel a little lacking.
I do have an issue with the potted history. Lehman guides us through the thinking that a strong naval force can protect and project a nation's beliefs, but when he gets to the War of 1812, his history moves onto shaky ground. Yes, the American 44's were superb fighting vessels and proved that the fledgling Navy could tackle a larger foe but Lehman is extremely disingenuous when noting the 44's record of disrupting British trade whilst ignoring the much larger Royal Navy's record in blockading US trade (and hence tax raising ability) for a much more disruptive economic effect.
There are also some factual errors. The most glaring was the Falklands War dates (2nd August to 14th June 1982!) and the comment that the Royal Navy re-took the Islands. True, the Navy was key to the whole operation but I think there would be many who served in the RAF and Army who would add comment to their role in the conflict.
Politics rears its ugly head quite often in the book as well, with some bi-partisanship being recognised but with an overall theme of "Republican good, Democrat bad!", even to the point of commenting that some people were good at their jobs despite their political leanings. Hmmm.
Then we have the central argument. The presence of a renewed and reinforced US Navy, especially in the Atlantic and Mediterranean effectively ended the Cold War. That's not something I agree with and to be honest, once America started deficit funding it's arms build up, there was no way the more economically constrained Soviet Union could hope to keep up. The argument about forward operation of carriers off the Kola Peninsular is also controversial and is probably better off decided on the wargaming table. I for one would not have liked to have been in CINCLANT's shoes if ordered to test out that theory. It's also here that Lehman's chronological jumping becomes the book's most confusing element, as does his habit of listing by year how many new ships the Soviets were building - ignoring the fact that ships take years to build so I am sure at one point he's added up the number of Slava-class cruisers to way more than the four actually launched.
His treatment of the Soviet Navy hierarchy is also suspect, with quotes used to demonstrate how fearful and fawning senior Soviet Admirals were of their American counterparts and their kit. Except, as far as I know and have read, they weren't. Lehman is also being a tad disingenuous by complaining that the Soviet naval build up continued after the change in political relations, so that new ships were being commissioned into the early 1990's. This ignores the time and effort spent in constructing them in the first place and you would never expect anyone to scrap such expenditure on a whim. Finally, there is a lack of detail in some of the revelations, most notably the Kamchatka Peninsula overflight in the early 1980's. This is the second text to reference that operation but doesn't give any specifics. Even the declaration of American carrier ops in Norwegian fjords could have done with a bit more detail.
It is in the epilogue though, where Lehman climbs fully onto his soapbox and truly shows his political colours. He ponders the (in his mind) correct decision to scale down the fleet after the Cold War ended but then laments that force sizes are too small to meet the present day threats which the US Navy might face. I think Lehman is wrong here. The forces built up in the 1980's are pretty much either retired or near end of service life (with the exception of the carriers). Whilst technical advances have made individual ships more potent, they have also made them more expensive and Lehman avoids the question of how a force equivalent to the 1980's US Navy would be funded. Deficit funding back them worked as there was a period afterwards where spending was reduced. Compare then to now, where the War on Terror has, amongst other things, left America with a debt pile that is eye watering (some $22.8 trillion!) Fiscal pressure alone would make any comparable naval build up now simply unaffordable, and that isn't including the controversial budgets for the new Ford-class carriers, the abortive Zumwalt-class destroyers and the pork-barrel that is the Littoral Combat Ship. Lehman here seems to want his cake and eat it, a powerful naval force without considering how it could be paid for.
So, if you ignore the above issues and take Oceans Ventured as what it purports to be, you'll probably enjoy Lehman's book. Similarly, if your politics fit in here, it could be one for you. As for me, I expected a bit more of a history and detail so it rates as ok-ish but quite a bit of a disappointment overall.
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